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WHICH REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION?
OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING
THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE
PEOPLE. By Randy E. Barnett.1 New York: HarperCollins
Publishers. 2016. Pp. xiv + 283. $26.99 (cloth).
Jack M. Balkin2
I. RANDY BARNETT, MEET INIGO MONTOYA
Reading Randy Barnett’s new book Our Republican
Constitution,3 one feels like Inigo Montoya in The Princess Bride:
“You keep using that word, ‘republican.’ I do not think it means
what you think it means.” Randy Barnett and I agree that we have
a republican constitution. The problem is that we disagree about
what that entails.
Barnett’s Republican Constitution has relatively little to do
with the historical tradition of republicanism, a tradition that
celebrates the common good; seeks to inculcate civic virtue;
opposes aristocracy, oligarchy, and corruption; understands
liberty not as mere negative freedom but as non-domination;
connects civil rights to civic duties; and demands a government
that derives its powers from and is ultimately responsive to the
great body of the people.
In fact, Barnett’s “republicanism” is far closer to what most
historians of the Founding era would regard as the opposite or
complement of the republican tradition. This is the tradition of
natural rights liberalism, which begins with John Locke and
evolves into classical liberalism in the nineteenth century. This
tradition celebrates individual autonomy, views the state as
1. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory; Director, Georgetown Center
for the Constitution.
2. Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law
School. My thanks to Sanford Levinson for comments on a previous draft.
3. RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE
LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016).
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organized to protect the natural rights of individuals, fears the
tyranny of majorities, and treats liberty as a negative freedom—a
protected space in which individuals, free from state control, may
accumulate property and pursue happiness (pp. 49-50).
The classical liberal tradition is an important part of the
American political tradition; but it is not the republican tradition.
The American political tradition is a blend of liberal and
republican ideals, which reappear in ever new guises as historical
circumstances and political alliances change. Barnett has
obscured the historical republican tradition by lifting the term and
applying it to its opposite number. In fact, Barnett’s vision of Our
Republican Constitution is perhaps closest to an idealization of
the classical liberal constitution of the late nineteenth century,
which combined dual federalism with police powers
jurisprudence.4
This late nineteenth-century version of classical liberalism is
the hero of Barnett’s story. Every hero needs an adversary to
compete with, and so Barnett constructs an opposite tradition,
which he calls the Democratic Constitution; it seems to be an
amalgam of Rousseau and early twentieth-century progressivism.
Barnett pronounces our true Constitution to be the Republican
(i.e., classical liberal) version. Barnett concedes that the
Democratic Constitution is part of our history, but argues that it
is not the best and truest version of our political selves. The
Democratic Constitution (i.e., progressivism) is actually
inconsistent with the basic premises of the American
constitutional order. Indeed, as Barnett shows us—more in
sorrow than in anger—following the perfection of the
constitutional system in the nineteenth century, the Democratic
Constitution has been ascendant. As a result, things have tended
to fall apart, leading to the depredations of the New Deal, the
Administrative State, and the Welfare State. To redeem Our
Republican Constitution, we must remedy the fall that came in

4. On police powers jurisprudence, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE
(1993) (describing the late nineteenth-century attempt to distinguish laws that served the
public interest in health, safety, and welfare from laws that imposed unjustified special
burdens or benefits or otherwise had secretly redistributive purposes). The classic
treatment of dual federalism is Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA.
L. REV. 1 (1950) (describing the nineteenth-century model of distinct competences of
federal and state regulatory authority, which largely operated in separate spheres).
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the early twentieth century. We must renounce progressivism and
all its works.
The disagreement between Barnett and me about the
meaning of republicanism is not merely semantic. By taking the
word “republican” and pasting it onto the classical liberal
tradition, he has buried a truly important tradition in American
constitutional thought—the actual historical republican tradition,
which is not the same as Barnett’s “Democratic Constitution.”
The historical republican tradition crosscuts Barnett’s opposition
between Republican and Democratic Constitutions, and includes
features of both. More to the point, the historical republican
tradition is especially relevant today, and it stands as a valuable
critique of the limitations of late nineteenth-century classical
liberalism.
In saying this, however, I am not advocating that we simply
ignore the lessons of Barnett’s book and hew to the historical
republican tradition. Like the classical liberal tradition, the
historical republican tradition is flawed and compromised in its
historical context. Only some parts of these two traditions are
worth preserving and bringing forward into the present.
Classical liberals have often been too complacent about
threats to republics that stem from inequalities of wealth and
coercive aspects of market economies. The historical tradition of
republicanism, by contrast, insisted that economic self-sufficiency
was central to participation in republican government. This
demand, however, produced both conservative and egalitarian
versions of republicanism.
Conservative versions of republicanism sought to limit
political freedoms to those (male) heads of households who were
not dependent on others and therefore were free to pursue the
public good. This excluded women, slaves, and persons who did
not own much property. In fact, older and more conservative
versions of republicanism, while opposing hierarchies or
distinctions of rank among male heads of households, were either
complacent about or actually defended hierarchies within
households.5 These versions of republicanism assumed that in
order for men to be independent and self-governing, they had to
5. Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1668 (1998)
(“Patriarchy was comfortably compatible with classical republicanism: the head of the
family represented the family (and its servants and slaves) in its relationship to the state.”).
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be supported by women, slaves, and servants who were
economically dependent on them. A similar argument justified
property qualifications for the suffrage—if landless workers were
dependent on their employers, they would simply vote their
employers’ interests and would fail to promote the public good.6
The egalitarian version of republicanism, by contrast, has
argued that government should work to dismantle hierarchies of
domination and dependence. Government should create the
conditions for a broad base of middle-class voters who are
financially independent and therefore could rule themselves.
These were the ambitions of the founders of the nineteenthcentury Republican Party, who sought both to eliminate slavery
and to secure the conditions of economic self-sufficiency for a
broad base of the public.7 The egalitarian strand of republicanism
was influenced by liberalism, because liberalism has historically
been willing to disrupt and transform existing social arrangements
in order to realize the freedom and equality of individuals.8 It is
this egalitarian version of republicanism, together with the liberal
tradition of respect for individual dignity and freedom, that we
should carry forward with us into the present.
My disagreement with Barnett is not a disagreement about
the importance of natural law and liberalism to the American

6. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,
1789–1815, at 8–9 (2009).
7. See Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal
Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 38–40 (1990) (describing exclusionary and
inclusionary versions of republicanism, and identifying the inclusionary version with the
early Republican Party). Nevertheless, inegalitarian features of republican ideology were
present even here. As Hendrik Hartog has pointed out, “Because of their republican
inheritance,” the members of the early Republican Party “could not imagine how to
accomplish th[e] enfranchisement [of blacks] without constituting black men as possessors
of domains of women and children, without making freedmen into ‘householders.’”
Hendrik Hartog, Imposing Constitutional Traditions, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 81
(1987).
8. That is why republicans can no more do without liberalism than liberals can do
without republicanism. To counteract the conservative and preservationist tendencies of
republicanism, egalitarians have drawn on critical features of the liberal tradition, which
emphasizes the equal freedom of every individual and the transformation of social
relations to achieve this end. See Kerber, supra note 5, at 1669 (“When Elizabeth Cady
Stanton and her colleagues wanted to demand a place in the republican polity, republican
discourse helped them little. To sustain the proposition that all are created free, equal, and
independent, they needed Locke, not Machiavelli.”); see also Hartog, supra note 7, at 82
(arguing that in embracing the republican tradition, one should not forget “the
disruptiveness and transformative characteristics that are a part of a liberal constitutional
tradition”).

3 - BALKIN_DRAFT 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

WHICH REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION?

1/3/17 8:51 AM

35

constitutional tradition. My point, rather, is that by emphasizing
the classical liberal tradition to the exclusion of the historical
republican tradition, he has given us an impoverished account of
American constitutionalism. The American constitutional
tradition, understood in its best sense, has always drawn on
elements of both the republican and liberal traditions, and applied
them to the problems and circumstances of the present. It has
employed the best parts of each tradition to critique and
transcend the blindnesses and limitations of the other. That is as
true of the Founding period as it is of the present. No
reconstruction of the American constitutional tradition can afford
to discard one-half of this dialectic.
Our Republican Constitution, however, is not written as—or
intended to be—a historical tome. It is an argument about
present-day constitutionalism directed to a popular audience. For
that reason, it might make sense for Barnett to write this book in
the way he has, labeling the classical liberal tradition he celebrates
as “Republican.” The reasons, however, have little to do with
historical fidelity, and everything to do with how Barnett
imagined we would structure debates about the direction of the
Constitution and the country in the near future.
When Barnett set down to write this book, fresh from his
partial victory in the Health Care Case,9 libertarians and
constitutional conservatives might have hoped that the
contemporary Republican Party might finally come to its senses.
It might embrace Barnett’s constitutional ideas about limited
government in order to hold off the forces of progressive social
democracy championed by the Democratic Party (p. 10). But, to
everyone’s amazement, the terms of political debate have shifted
radically in the interim. In the world we now inhabit, the argument
of Barnett’s book risks being shoved rudely aside. The only
political party that might embrace his ideas about the
Constitution has descended into internal bickering and has been
captured by a demagogue, the very sort of demagogue the
Founders warned us about. Before the Republican Party can
embrace Our Republican Constitution, it must first fight off the
populist insurgency within its own ranks. The irony then, is that a
book written to intervene in a contemporary debate about the

9.

NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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Constitution may be most important for a political future whose
contours are still uncertain.
II. BARNETT’S REPUBLICANISM
What does Barnett mean by a republican constitution? First,
Barnett’s republicanism is the opposite of direct democracy and
simple majority rule. It embraces an individual conception of
popular sovereignty in which each and every one of us is a
sovereign (p. 23). It opposes a collective conception of popular
sovereignty, which, Barnett believes, leads to the view that the
government should respect the will of the majority (pp. 97, 126).
The problem with majority rule is that majorities always threaten
to violate the rights of individuals or minority groups. When
majorities do not respect rights, they are little more than a faction
in control of government (pp. 56, 97).
Second, the purpose of government is to protect the natural
rights of individuals. Natural rights preexist government and
governments are instituted for their protection (pp. 23, 41-44).
They include the right to acquire and possess property, to choose
a calling, and to pursue happiness (pp. 24, 25, 33, 39, 66-69, 107).
Natural rights are negative liberties against majority compulsion.
When government secures natural rights, they create a space in
which people may pursue their own visions of happiness (pp. 4950).
In order to protect natural rights, it is not enough to
enumerate rights. The enumeration of rights is no more than a
fail-safe to prevent the worst excesses of majority tyranny (pp.
167-168). To prevent majorities from behaving like factions, we
must impose structural limits on government, through devices
such as the separation of powers and federalism (pp. 167-171).
Third, one should never confuse what government officials
do with some Rousseau-ian fantasy of “the Will of the People.”
Government officials are not the people. They are merely
servants or agents of the people and they must always exercise
their agency consistent with their duty to protect natural rights
(pp. 22-23). The point of a constitution is to govern the agents who
govern the people.
These considerations apply with special force to judges, who
have an important role to play in a constitutional republic. Judges
must exercise judicial review to ensure that laws and executive
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actions do not overstep the just powers of government and violate
people’s natural rights. Judicial review is not simply a power—it
is the duty of judges to ensure that government agents adhere to
limits on government (p. 25, 128). Therefore courts should not
assume that legislation is constitutional, as they often do. Instead
of a presumption of constitutionality, courts should engage in a
presumption of liberty (p. 243). They should ask whether a law
unduly limits liberty, regardless of whether the liberties affected
are specifically enumerated in the Constitution (pp. 244-245).
Liberty is not simply a collection of enumerated rights; it is the
very purpose of government, and courts should stand ready to
hold government officials to account and require them to explain
why restraints on liberty are justified. It follows that judicial
restraint is not a virtue. It is an abdication of the duty of judges to
enforce constitutional limits that are necessary to protect
individuals’ natural rights (pp. 24, 225, 245).
Barnett identifies each of these positions with the Founders.
They believed that the purpose of government was to secure
natural rights, and they had experienced the excesses of
democracy in the period immediately following the American
Revolution. In order to secure individuals’ natural rights, they
created the Constitution’s system of federalism, separation of
powers, and checks and balances. These structural features—and
not the enumeration of specific rights—were the most important
devices for securing liberty from the tyranny of majority factions
(pp. 209-210).
To be sure, the Founders accepted slavery, and this was a
defect in the original conception of the Constitution. But this
defect was cured by the adoption of the Reconstruction
Amendments (pp. 60-61). With the adoption of these
amendments in the nineteenth century, Our Republican
Constitution was completed as a vehicle for the defense of
individual natural rights.10 The only question was whether
Americans could keep such a republic. In Barnett’s view, the
country failed miserably during the Progressive Era and the New
Deal, and despite occasional successes, the failures have only
accumulated.

10. BARNETT p. 62 (“[T]he text of the Constitution was amended by a new
Republican Party to complete our Republican Constitution.”).
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III. WHAT KIND OF ARGUMENT IS BARNETT
MAKING?
Although Barnett quotes the Founders at many points in the
book, his argument is not really an argument about the original
meaning of the Constitution. At least, it is not an argument from
original meaning according to Barnett’s own theory of how to
interpret the Constitution. That theory distinguishes between
discovering the original communicative content of the
Constitution—the task of constitutional interpretation—and
constitutional “constructions,” which fill out, make sense of, and
apply the constitutional text.11
Much of the argument of the book is not constitutional
interpretation in the sense described above, because it is not an
exegesis of the original communicative content of the text of the
Constitution. In fact, the document on which Barnett lavishes the
most attention is the Declaration of Independence, and he takes
us through several of its key passages with a focus that is almost
Talmudic in its attentions. Barnett uses the Declaration to
elaborate what he regards as the essential ethos of the
Constitution. According to Barnett’s theory of constitutional
interpretation, this argument is a construction of the
Constitution—albeit the best and most appropriate construction.
Similarly, his “presumption of liberty” is not an account of the
original communicative content of the Constitution’s text. Rather,
it is an important construction directed at judges and designed to
fulfill the Constitution’s larger purposes.12
Nor is Barnett really making an argument about original
intentions. His account of history is deliberately schematic and it
picks and chooses certain features of the thought of the Founders,
while leaving many others out—including, most notably, elements
that reflect the actual republican tradition. It is also a telltale sign
that Barnett spends so much effort expounding the Declaration,
which is not part of the Constitution. (Like many scholars,
including myself, he nevertheless believes that the Declaration
11. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89–130 (2004) (distinguishing between interpretation and
construction); Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of the New Originalism, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 412, 419–20 (2013) (same); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and
Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2011) (same).
12. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, supra note 11, at 70 (“[A] ‘presumption
of liberty’ that places the burden on the government to justify its restrictions on liberty as
necessary and proper. . . . is a constitutional construction.”).
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should serve as the Constitution’s guiding star.) Barnett collapses
different groups of people and different generations together and
speaks of the Founders as a single entity with a single
consciousness. This rhetorical practice signals that he engaged in
a special kind of argument that is not well captured by the
conventional categories of original intention or original
meaning.13 It is, however, a very common style of argument in
American law and politics.
What kind of argument is Barnett making then? Understood
in its best light, his book is an argument about the ethos of the
Constitution and about the American political tradition. In my
categorization of historical modalities of argument, it is an
argument from ethos and from political tradition, which draws on
examples of the thought and actions of honored authorities during
the Founding, the Antebellum Era, and Reconstruction.14 Such
arguments are often treated as “originalist” in a broad sense, and
they sometimes look like arguments from original meaning or
original intention. But they have a special quality.
First, they are often narrative arguments that offer a broad
perspective on history. To show us what he means by a
Republican Constitution, Barnett takes us from the American
Revolution through the twentieth century.
Second, these arguments marry the descriptive and the
normative through the use of storytelling. Through appeals to
selected statements and moments from the past, these arguments
explain the kinds of values that Americans have been committed
to and should be committed to.
Third, arguments from ethos and political tradition inevitably
simplify history because the values of a tradition have not always
been embraced or fully put into effect. It is always possible to list
many examples—and indeed entire periods—in which the
tradition’s values are not honored. For example, governments
have not always protected natural rights or the equality of
persons, and Barnett would argue that this is true of much of
contemporary American governance. But when Americans have
13. Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 641, 677 (2013) (“Arguments that appeal to the Founders or the Framers as an
undifferentiated whole, or that conflate different generations (revolutionaries, Framers,
politicians of the early federal period) are likely to be arguments from tradition or ethos.”).
14. Id. at 676–87 (describing arguments from ethos, tradition, and honored
authority).
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been true to their traditions, Barnett would say, they have
protected natural rights and equality. Thus, arguments from ethos
and political tradition select strands of history that best reflect the
most valuable features of our history and assert that these strands
reflect the true or authentic practices of the tradition, even if they
have been honored in the breach as much as in the observance.
Fourth, because these arguments are narrative in conception,
they trace the history of ideas through the clash of peoples and
groups. Some of these people are the heroes of the story, and their
opponents are people we are supposed to root against.15
Accordingly, Barnett constructs a counter-tradition, which
he calls the Democratic Constitution. He argues that this
tradition, although present throughout American history, does
not reflect the truest and best parts of our tradition. To some
extent we have even been led astray by this tradition. Barnett
generally identifies this tradition with persons and groups he does
not particularly admire, like the Jacksonians who apologized for
slavery, Woodrow Wilson, and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.16
He especially identifies it with progressives in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Progressives treated rights as an
object of democratic deliberation and majority control. They
denied natural rights or argued that they had to give way to the
requirements of the common good.
Arguments from ethos and tradition inevitably simplify
history, because these arguments use history to show us what is
most valuable. They are didactic rather than merely descriptive.
For this reason, these arguments inevitably pick out heroes and
villains, people to root for and people to root against. In Barnett’s
account, the heroes of our constitutional tradition are the
Founders, the abolitionists, and the founders of the Republican
Party. Their modern heirs, he insists, are classical liberals and
libertarians. The villains (or at least adversaries) in the story are
the defenders of slavery, Jacksonian Democrats, the Progressives,
the defenders of the New Deal, and liberals. Their contemporary
heirs are political progressives and liberals in the Democratic
Party, and majoritarian conservatives in the Republican Party.

15. Id. at 684–85 (describing strategies of selective identification and disidentification in arguments from ethos and tradition).
16. BARNETT p. 89 (apologists for slavery); pp. 136–37 (Wilson), 138–44 (Holmes).
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It is true that most of the followers of the “Republican
Constitution” find themselves in the contemporary Republican
Party, and most of the adherents of the “Democratic
Constitution” find themselves in the contemporary Democratic
Party. But this, Barnett insists, is merely an accident of history,
because some conservative Republicans also argue for
majoritarianism and judicial restraint. Conversely, some
Democrats believe in strong judicial review to protect (some)
natural rights, although, unfortunately, not on questions of
national power and economic regulation (pp. 18-19).
Because Barnett is not making an argument from original
intention or original meaning in a technical sense, criticizing him
for failure to make these arguments correctly misses the point of
his argument.17 To take arguments from ethos and tradition
seriously on their own terms, one must recognize that these
arguments obtain their normative weight from interpretations of
the past premised on a narrative about the history and trajectory
of the nation. It follows that the most appropriate way to respond
to arguments from ethos and political tradition is to: (1)
complicate the narrative; (2) offer counter-narratives and
counter-traditions that better describe the nation’s values and
path; and (3) show how a fuller account of history suggests
different normative lessons.18
That is why the question of whether Barnett is correctly using
the term “republican” is not and should not be merely a semantic
dispute. The real question is whether he has adequately captured
the traditions of American constitutional thought from which he
wishes to draw normative conclusions, and whether a fuller
account of history would point to different normative
commitments.
As I noted in the introduction, Barnett has misdescribed an
important tradition in American political thought that is properly
called republican. Although he borrows a few strands from that
tradition, his account is better described as the opposite or the
complement of the republican tradition—the tradition of classical
liberalism. This version of liberalism flowers in the late nineteenth
17. Balkin, supra note 13, at 678–82 (explaining that arguments of this type simplify
historical narratives for presentist, didactic purposes).
18. Id. at 689 (arguing that critiques of arguments from ethos and political tradition
“offer counternarratives. . . . complicate history. . . .[and] draw competing normative
lessons from history”).
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century in theories of dual federalism and police powers
jurisprudence designed to preserve individual liberty, and
especially economic liberty.
Although Barnett identifies his theory with the Founders, it
is really a sympathetic restatement of late nineteenth-century
(and early twentieth-century) classical liberalism. He reads the
nineteenth century back onto the eighteenth, making it more
classically liberal—and less republican—than it actually was.
Conversely, his “Democratic Constitution” is really a restatement
of early twentieth-century progressivism which arises in
opposition to the Gilded Age. He reads progressive ideas back
into the eighteenth century to construct the historical adversary
of his favored account of the Constitution.
In short, the opposition that Barnett wants to draw between
the Republican and Democratic Constitutions is really a
schematic or idealized version of the struggle between classical
liberalism and progressivism at the beginning of the twentieth
century. This is an important clash of values, and it had
momentous consequences for the way we understand
constitutional law today. But this struggle is not really a
Founding-era tension in the way that Barnett portrays it. It is
about two different interpretations of the Founding offered over
a century later, by people who found themselves in what I call
constitutional modernity—facing a world very different from the
Founders and asking what the correct way forward should be.19
At the turn of the twentieth century, classical liberals and
progressives took very different lessons from the past.
Progressives saw a Constitution increasingly unable to deal with
plutocracy. The Civil War had taught them that our constitutional
system could fail and had failed. They were therefore drawn to
constitutional reform, leading to a series of constitutional
amendments during the first three decades of the twentieth
century. Classical liberals, drawing on Jacksonian and abolitionist
ideas of free labor and natural rights, increasingly identified the
Constitution with judicial protection of economic liberties and
they developed constitutional doctrines to protect these rights.20
Barnett’s book is less an account of the actual values of the
19. On constitutional modernity and responses to it, see Jack M. Balkin, Why Are
Americans Originalist?, in LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY: SOCIO-LEGAL ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF ROGER COTTERRELL (David Schiff & Richard Nobles eds., 2014).
20. See GILLMAN, supra note 4.
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Founders than an account of one interpretation of the
constitutional tradition, designed to deal with problems of
modernity, and developed a century after the Founders.
At various points in his narrative Barnett lumps modern
liberals together with progressives.21 This is somewhat unfair.
Although many of the heirs of progressivism are called liberals
today, modern liberalism—at least the mid to late twentiethcentury version—is actually a synthesis of classical liberalism and
progressivism. Modern liberals agreed with classical liberals that
government must protect both enumerated and unenumerated
rights and that judges must enforce these rights. To this day
liberals and libertarians often agree about many civil liberties
issues. Modern liberals broke from classical liberalism, however,
on issues of economic and property rights, and on the scope of
federal power.22 Here they borrowed from the progressive
critique of classical liberalism. Modern liberals continued to
believe that the purpose of government was to secure the rights
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. But modern liberals
argued that in economic circumstances completely different from
the Founding, it was necessary to regulate markets and property
to give ordinary people as well as wealthy people a genuine shot
at pursuing happiness. Similarly, modern liberals took from the
Whigs and the early Republican Party the lesson that federal
power was necessary to promote economic development and
economic opportunity, and that the federal government should
invest in infrastructure and public goods to achieve these ends. By
contrast, late nineteenth-century classical liberals increasingly
rejected the views of the Whigs and the early Republican Party on
federal power; they embraced what were essentially Jacksonian
ideas about formal equality of opportunity and Jacksonian
arguments for limited national power. Barnett must omit these
details from his narrative because they complicate his central

21. See p. 129 (noting that by 1929, “Progressives . . . were calling themselves
liberals”).
22. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF HOPE AND THE
BITTER HERITAGE: AMERICAN LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S 89 (2007) (noting the
redefinition of liberalism to meet the needs of the early twentieth century); DAVID E.
BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST
PROGRESSIVE REFORM 55 (2011) (“Modern ‘liberal’ constitutional jurisprudence, rather
than being descended solely from the ideas of early-twentieth century Progressive jurists,
is a synthesis of Progressive fondness for government regulation, and the classical liberal
. . . support for individual rights and skepticism of government power.”).
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point that the founders of the Republican Party were heroes
because they ended slavery and sought to protect natural rights.
But they did so by rejecting not only Jacksonian ideas about
slavery but also Jacksonian conceptions of limited federal power.
IV. WHAT IS THE REPUBLICAN TRADITION?
As I have noted, Barnett’s account of republicanism would
be unrecognizable to historians of the republican tradition in the
United States. In fact, in many ways it is the opposite or
complement of what historians would call the republican
tradition. This section explains why.
Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s historians of the American
Revolution began a revival of the republican tradition in
American politics and constitutionalism. The key players were
Bernard Bailyn,23 J.G.A. Pocock,24 and Gordon Wood,25 and they
developed what came to be known as the Republican Synthesis.26
They argued that the Founding generation owed as much to the
ideas of James Harrington, Baron de Montesquieu and “Country
Party” ideology, as they did to the work of John Locke and the
liberal tradition of natural rights. The latter tradition is the
ancestor of the classical liberal tradition that Barnett mislabels as
“republican.”
These historians did not agree in all respects—Pocock, for
example, emphasized the influence of Niccolo Machiavelli and
the classical humanist tradition. But together they pointed to a
vibrant tradition of republicanism that played an important role
in Founding-era thought. Scholars like Joyce Appleby,27 Isaac

23. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1968).
24. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975).
25. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1991);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
26. See Robert Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an
Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 49
(1972); see also LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A
PARTY IDEOLOGY (1978); Robert Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American
Historiography, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 334 (1982).
27. JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE
REPUBLICANISM OF THE 1790S (1984) (arguing that Jefferson’s commitments to agrarian
capitalism and free trade made him as liberal as he was republican); JOYCE APPLEBY,
LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION (1992).
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Kramnick,28 and John Patrick Diggins,29 critiqued the civic
republican historians. They pointed out that the Founders held
both liberal and republican ideals, and that their ideas constantly
evolved as they confronted the growth of commercial society and
the problems of governing the new republic.30 During the 1980s
and 1990s, when Barnett and I began our academic careers, the
law reviews were full of discussions of the civic republican
tradition and its potential relevance to American constitutional
law.31
Today most historians believe that the Founding era was a
pragmatic mix of both republican and liberal themes and that this
ideological mixture was continually evolving throughout the
Revolution and the early years of the republic.32 Liberalism
increasingly dominates as America moved into the nineteenth
century, but republican ideas—like belief in the public good,
opposition to oligarchy, and concerns about political corruption—
have always remained in the American political and constitutional
tradition. We can find different elements of republicanism on
both sides of key political controversies, like those between
Federalists and Jeffersonians, Whigs and Jacksonians, early
Republicans and post-bellum Democrats, and so on into the
present. Indeed, many republican themes appear in political
discourse on both the left and the right today. When both left and
28. Issac Kramnick, Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 AM. HIST. REV. 629 (1982)
(emphasizing the importance of Lockean liberalism in the Founding); ISSAC KRAMNICK,
REPUBLICANISM AND BOURGEOIS RADICALISM: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN LATE
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1990) (same).
29. JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1984)
(emphasizing the influence of Locke and Calvinism and arguing that republicanism is a
surface gloss on a deeper liberal political tradition).
30. See also Daniel T. Rogers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM.
HIST. 11 (1992) (examining and critiquing the Republican Synthesis as a Kuhnian research
paradigm); RICHARD C. SINOPOLI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CIVIC VIRTUE (1992) (pointing out that eighteenth-century
liberalism included many features of civic republicanism, and vice-versa).
31. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM
(1992); Symposium, Classical Philosophy and the American Constitutional Order, 66 CHI.KENT L. REV. 3 (1990); Symposium, Roads Not Taken: Undercurrents of Republican
Thinking in Modern Constitutional Theory, 84 NW. U.L. REV. 1 (1989); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989);
Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Morton J.
Horowitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 57 (1987); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
32. Alan Gibson, Ancients, Moderns and Americans: The Republicanism-Liberalism
Debate Revisited, 21 HIST. POL. THEORY 261, 261–62 (2000).
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right argue that Washington is corrupt, that government has been
taken over by an elite oligarchy and that the little guy can’t catch
a break, they are summoning elements of the republican tradition.
What are the themes of the historical republican tradition?
We might identify seven of them.33
First, the framers opposed republicanism not merely to direct
popular rule, but also to monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy.34
In the American version of republicanism, a republic is an antimonarchical, anti-aristocratic, and anti-oligarchical form of
government.35
Second, republicanism requires that citizens must work for
the public good. A republic is a res publica, a “public thing,” or
the “public good,” and citizens have a duty to further and defend

33. The description of republican themes in the next nine paragraphs is drawn from
Jack M. Balkin, Republicanism and the Constitution of Opportunity, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1427,
1432–37 (2016).
34. Thus, when Barnett quotes Richard Beeman as noting that all of the Founders
were republicans, see p. 27 (quoting RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION xi (2009)), Beeman is actually emphasizing
the Founders’ opposition to monarchy and aristocracy as much as their opposition to direct
democracy. See. e.g., Beeman, supra, at xi–xii (arguing that “the vast majority of the
Founding Fathers” were republicans because “they had rejected monarchy and hereditary
rule and had embraced unequivocally the idea of representative government,” although
they differed on the nature of representation); id. at 81 (“In the wake of their revolution
against monarchical rule, all Americans embraced the idea that legislatures—composed of
representatives answerable to the people—were the heart and soul of any system of truly
‘republican’ government); id. at 122 (noting that at the time of the Founding, “republican”
meant opposition to “hereditary monarchy” and support for “some form of representative
government,” but not “unmediated democracy”) (emphasis in original); id. at 344–45
(noting that the American Revolution was not only waged against “a tyrannical King and
Parliament,” but was “also a struggle of virtue against vice, of republican simplicity against
the dissipation that extravagance of frivolity inevitably encouraged”); id. at 412 (arguing
that the 1787 Constitution “was in many respects unmistakably republican” in that “[i]t
emphatically rejected notions of hereditary monarchy and aristocracy” while “stopping
well-short” of democracy).
35. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (“It is essential to [republican]
government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an
inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles,
exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of
republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of republic.”) (emphasis in
original); THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the Constitution’s
ban on titles of nobility as “the corner stone of republican government; for so long as they
are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the government will be any other than
that of the people.”). See generally WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, supra note 25 (describing how republicanism sought to disestablish
monarchy and aristocracy in politics and culture).
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it through their efforts in politics.36 The public interest is not
identical with the private interest of any individual or group.
People may disagree about what is in the public interest—indeed,
in a democracy they often do. But they must direct their efforts
and politics as a whole toward the realization of the public interest
and the promotion of the res publica.37 Moreover, because
republicanism is grounded on belief in the common good and the
public interest, many republican rights include duties which are
connected to the defense of the republic and republican values.
The right to keep and bear arms is an example. A purely liberal
conception of the right to keep and bear arms is a right of
individual self-defense. But a republican conception of the right
to keep and bear arms is a public duty of citizens to take up arms
and, if necessary, to give their lives, to defend the republic against
tyranny and corruption.38
Third, republicanism includes a principle of civic equality.
Because republicanism opposes monarchy, aristocracy, and
oligarchy, all citizens are equal as citizens and the state may not
elevate some special class of citizenry above the rest.39 This idea
is finally enshrined in the text of our Constitution during
Reconstruction in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
but it is implicit in the concept of republican government.40 The
prohibition against class and caste legislation, recognized in
antebellum state constitutional law as well as in the Fourteenth
Amendment, follows from the republican commitment to the
equality of citizens.
Fourth, republicanism includes a principle against
domination.41 Republican liberty includes formal freedom from

36. Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man, in COLLECTED WRITINGS 565 (Eric Foner ed.,
1995) (“RES-PUBLICA, the public affairs, or the public good; or literally translated, the
public thing . . . refers to what ought to be the character and business of government.”).
37. See WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 25, at 55–
56.
38. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 6, at 7–8.
39. Id. at 8.
40. Melissa Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation and Colorblindness, 96
MICH. L. REV. 245, 254 (1997) (arguing that antebellum state courts believed that class
legislation “threatened true republican government and with it, personal liberty”).
41. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT
6, 12 (1997) (arguing that the distinctively republican conception of freedom is nondomination). Pettit is the most prominent defender of the classical tradition of republican
liberty in contemporary political philosophy.
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restraint but it also requires non-domination.42 Mere freedom
from interference or restraint does not guarantee non-domination
either in civil society or in politics.43 In republican ideology,
people who are dominated by others are not free but slaves.44
Slavery is the condition that occurs when people lack republican
liberty and cannot rule themselves.
The republican opposition of slavery to freedom is political
as well as economic.45 Chattel slavery is only a special case of
slavery. At time of the American Revolution, the Founding
generation sometimes spoke of themselves as slaves because they
had no representation in Parliament.46 The colonists were not
arguing that they were chattel slaves; rather they argued that they
lived under the domination of a distant government.
Fifth, republicanism includes a commitment to self-rule.47 In
order for the people as a whole to be free, the government must
respect their freedom. But a mere grant of civil freedom at the
sufferance of the state is not enough, because the state can take it
away. Therefore, in order for people to be their own masters, the
government must respect the rights of the public and it must be
responsive to the public’s views over time.48 Hence the principle
42. Id. at 21 (“[T]he conception of freedom as non-domination, not the negative
conception of freedom as non-interference . . . was embraced among writers in the
republican tradition.”).
43. Id. at 31 (“[T]here may be loss of [republican] liberty without any actual
interference.”).
44. Id. at 31–32 (arguing that republican liberty is premised on the distinction
between free citizens and those persons, like slaves, who are subject to the arbitrary power
of another).
45. Id. at 32–33, 71–72 (distinguishing political liberty from political slavery—
dependence on others).
46. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1459, 1481–88 (2013).
47. Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 759–
60 (1994) (arguing that “[t]he central pillar of Republican Government . . . is popular
sovereignty” and that the “deepest spirit of republicanism” is democratic self-rule).
48. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison) (“The genius of Republican
liberty, seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should be derived from the
people; but, that those entrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people . . . .”).
The idea that the preservation of republican liberty requires popular control of
government is not central to the classical republicanism of Machiavelli but develops in the
eighteenth century with the rise of democracy. PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra note 41, at
30–31. This is the republicanism of the American Revolution and of the American
Constitution. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 278–81
(2005) (describing how republicanism was equated with popular sovereignty in late
eighteenth-century thought).
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of non-domination not only guarantees personal liberty; it also
requires self-rule, and a representative form of government.49
Sixth, republicanism includes an anti-corruption principle.
Corruption is the central enemy of republics, and it is a feature of
both individuals and political systems. Corruption occurs when
government officials lose their devotion to the public good and
are no longer responsive to and dependent on public opinion.
Then officials promote their private interest or the private interest
of some elite faction or oligarchy over the public interest and the
public good.50 To maintain a viable republic, one must prevent the
corruption of the political process. However, the problem of
corruption is ever-present.51 As time goes on, individuals and
groups, motivated by self-interest, disregard the common good,
strive for power, attempt to preserve and extend their status, and
in general, invent ever new ways to dominate each other.52
Therefore, in order to preserve a republic, citizens must be
eternally vigilant in discovering the emerging sources of
corruption within the political system and to nip them in the bud
before they have a chance to undermine republican government.
The best way to guard against corruption is to create institutions
that will preserve and promote civic virtue and cause individuals
and groups to work for the common good.53

49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (“[W]e may define a republic to be,
or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or
indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their
offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior.”).
50. PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra note 41, at 210 (explaining that in the republican
tradition corruption occurs when people “make their decisions by reference not to
considerations of the common good but rather to more sectional or private concerns”).
51. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 6, at 8 (“[R]eliance on the moral virtue
of their citizens, on their capacity for self-sacrifice and impartiality of judgment, was what
made republican governments historically so fragile.”).
52. PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra note 41, at 210 (arguing that the basic problem
of republican governance is to promote resilience and stability in the face of continual
sources of temptation and corruption).
53. Id. at 212 (noting that “however much it may have insisted on the importance of
virtue,” the republican tradition “has embraced the need . . . for a regime of checks and
balances.”). The Founding generation also emphasized the development of institutions of
learning to promote republican virtue. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 6, at 476–
77. Dr. Benjamin Rush famously argued that education should “convert men into
republican machines . . . to perform their parts properly in the great machine of the
government of the state.” Benjamin Rush, Of the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic,
in THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN RUSH 88, 90 (1798) (Dagobert D. Runes ed.,
1947).
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Seventh, as a result, republicanism includes a principle
against political self-entrenchment.54 Today’s majority must not
be able to entrench itself so as to prevent the development of a
future majority.55 If constitutional structure allows selfentrenchment, the system will be corrupted, and the people will
cease to become their own rulers, violating basic principles of
republican self-government.
To sum up: republicanism includes seven principles: (1)
opposition to monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy; (2) duties to
further the public good and act for the public interest; (3) equality
of citizenship with no special classes, privileges or disabilities that
might create a new aristocracy; (4) freedom as non-domination;
(5) individual and political self-rule; (6) a principle against
corruption (including individual and systemic corruption); and (7)
a principle against political self-entrenchment.
As you can see from this list, Barnett captures only a small
part of these republican themes in his version of Our Republican
Constitution. In fact, some of these themes are actually in tension
with his individualist, libertarian conception.
I do not mean to suggest that there is nothing republican in
Barnett’s account of the Founders’ beliefs. The Founding

54. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 243 (2011) (“The principle of republican
government prohibits political incumbents and temporary majorities from trying to
entrench themselves in power.”); see also Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 44–45 (2004) (arguing
that many different features of the Constitution are designed to prevent selfentrenchment); Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and
Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 114–16 (2000) (arguing that the
Republican Government Clause is designed to prevent political self-entrenchment).
55. Political self-entrenchment violates the republican principle of majority rule. See
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton)(“[A] fundamental maxim of republican
government . . . requires that the sense of the majority should prevail.”); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 58 (James Madison) (describing majority rule as “the fundamental principle of free
government”); 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 206, 212 (Robert A. Rutland &
Charles P. Hobson eds., 1977) (letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24,
1787)) (“[T}he republican principle . . . refers the ultimate decision to the will of the
majority.”); Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, available at http://avalon.
law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp (“[A]bsolute acquiescence in the decisions of the
majority [is] the vital principle of republics.”). In his Vices of the Political System Madison
argues that “According to Republican Theory, Right and power being both vested in the
majority, are held to be synonimous.” James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the
United States, in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 57, 59 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1981). But if a
minority uses superior force and property, “one third only may conquer the remaining two
thirds,” and “[w]here slavery exists the republican Theory becomes still more fallacious.”
Id.
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generation did believe in natural rights. They did believe that the
purpose (but not the only purpose) of government was to secure
these rights. Many of the Founders were quite concerned about
the dangers of direct democracy and they sought to adopt
structural guarantees of liberty. But Barnett’s account leaves out
much of the context in which these beliefs were situated. He
makes the Founders sound too much like late nineteenth-century
classical liberals or mid-twentieth-century members of the Mont
Pelerin Society.
For example, Barnett correctly points out that the Framers
were worried about the excess of democracy in state legislatures
following the American Revolution. What he misses is that these
concerns flowed from eighteenth-century republican ideology—
concerns about civic virtue and devotion to the public good. The
Founders doubted that state legislatures would uphold “their
republican responsibility to promote a unitary public interest
distinguishable from the private and parochial interests of
individuals.”56
There is no discussion of corruption or civic virtue in
Barnett’s account. Indeed, there is no mention of Bailyn, Pocock,
or Wood in either the text or the footnotes; nor does he discuss
the vast literature that qualifies and critiques their accounts. He
opposes republicanism to democracy rather than to monarchy,
aristocracy and oligarchy—which, for many of the Founders,
would have been the natural opposites of republican government.
He emphasizes the protection of natural rights and downplays the
Founders’ commitment to the public good.57
This is not an adequate account of the Founding generation’s
views. Surely they sought to protect individual liberty. But they
also believed that government had obligations to promote the
public interest (i.e., the public good).58 Doing so benefited

56. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 6, at 17.
57. See, e.g., p. 75 (equating the common good with “the protection of each person’s
life, liberty, and property”).
58. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 25, at 55. It is
worth emphasizing that although the Founders had many beliefs that we would today call
liberal, they were not nineteenth-century classical liberals and it is anachronistic to read
back nineteenth-century classical liberal ideas onto the eighteenth century. William
Michael Treanor, Taking the Founders Seriously, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1035–36 (1988)
(reviewing WALTER BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY (1987)). Jefferson,
for example, believed in a common good that transcended individual interests and did not
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individuals in allowing them to pursue happiness, and also
promoted civic virtue, good citizenship, and the good of all.
Many of the Founders also believed that it was important for
governments to maintain a particular political economy in which
economic inequality was kept within reasonable bounds in order
to prevent the development of aristocracy and oligarchy.59 The
Founding generation, Gordon Wood explains, “took for granted
that a society could not long remain republican if a tiny minority
controlled most of the wealth and the bulk of the population
remained dependent servants or poor landless laborers.”60
In fact, one of the reasons why Founders like Madison and
Jefferson sought to promote a republic dominated by small
farmers is that they believed that an agrarian republic would
prevent vast inequalities of wealth and forestall the inequality and
corruption they associated with monarchies and aristocracies.61
The restrictions on primogeniture that Jefferson placed in the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 were designed to break up large
landholding estates and prevent the growth of economic and
hereditary aristocracy. Similar reforms occurred at the state level.
Gordon Wood notes that “all the states in the decades following
the Revolution abolished both entail and primogeniture where
they existed.”62 The justifications were republican. As the North
Carolina legislature explained in a 1784 statute, these ancient
legal doctrines worked “only to raise the wealth and importance
of particular families and individuals, giving them an unequal and
undue influence in a republic, and prove in manifold instances the
source of great contention and injustice.”63 Reforming the laws
governing the most important source of wealth at the time—
ownership of land—would “tend to promote that equality of
property which is of the spirit and principle of a genuine
republic.”64

celebrate the unrestrained pursuit of economic self-interest. Joyce Appleby,
Republicanism in Old and New Contexts, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 20, 33 (1986).
59. See JOSEPH FISHKIN & WILLIAM E. FORBATH, THE ANTI-OLIGARCHY
CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2017).
60. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 6, at 8.
61. See DOUGLASS G. ADAIR, THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF JEFFERSONIAN
DEMOCRACY: REPUBLICANISM, THE CLASS STRUGGLE, AND THE VIRTUOUS FARMER 52
(1964 republished 2000).
62. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 6, at 498.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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When Jefferson and Madison created the first Republican
Party, the name reflected the belief that the policies of the
Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton, were pushing the country
toward monarchy, aristocracy, and corruption, while the
Republicans were the true inheritors of the virtuous politics of the
Revolution.65 Madison explained that his new party would be
called “Republican” because it sought to prevent the growth of
aristocracy and privilege.66 Whether or not it is consistent with
Barnett’s conception of natural rights of property, the use of
government to proactively forestall the creation of vast
inequalities of wealth is characteristically republican.67
Years later, when the Republican Party was formed in 1854,
its founders sought to resurrect several of Jefferson’s and
Madison’s ideas about political economy. The name
“Republican” was chosen not because the new party was
particularly opposed to direct democracy, but because it opposed
the Slave Power that had dominated American politics for more
than a generation. In the antebellum South, a small number of
plantation owners owned almost all of the wealth in the region
through their control over land and slaves. Republicans feared
that these men were attempting to use their economic and
political power to impose a new oligarchy on Americans.68 The
Republican demand for “free land” and “free soil” sought
equitable distribution of western land; Republicans argued that
the plantation system allowed wealthy slave owners to buy up
ever more property, crowding out small farmers and destroying
their economic independence.69 Once in power, Republicans
sought to prevent the accumulation of huge, landed estates and to
ensure economic independence for a broad spectrum of

65. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 6, at 151–52; ADAIR, INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 61.
66. James Madison, A Candid State of Parties, NAT. GAZETTE, Sept. 22, 1792.
67. HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, TO MAKE MEN FREE: A HISTORY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY xii, 4, 9 (2015).
68. Id. at 6–7; ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY
OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 87–91 (1995).
69. RICHARDSON, supra note 67, at 3–4; Andrew Shankman, Introduction: Conflict
for a Continent: Land, Labor, and the State in the First American Republic, in THE WORLD
OF THE REVOLUTIONARY AMERICAN REPUBLIC: LAND, LABOR AND THE CONFLICT FOR
A CONTINENT 17 (Andrew Shankman ed., 2014); see also FONER, supra note 68, at 46–50,
59–60, 63–65 (1995) (describing Republican and Free Soil critiques of Southern society,
which blamed the expansion of slavery for impoverishing whites who did not own slaves,
undermining social mobility, and perpetuating aristocracy).
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Americans—regardless of color—through distribution of
government-owned lands in the West and the creation of landgrant colleges and universities.70 One will find none of these ideas
in Barnett’s description of Our Republican Constitution, and the
distributional concerns of historical republicanism—and the early
Republican Party—are in some tension with his account of the
constitutional purposes of government.
Barnett’s description of republicanism, in short, is a
remarkable act of historiographical chutzpah. He takes a few
features of republican ideology, staples them onto classical
liberalism, and then calls the result “republicanism.” It is a little
like creating a fantasy baseball team that takes a few of the
Yankees’ best players, adds most of the Boston Red Sox, and calls
the team “the New York Yankees.” You can call your fantasy
baseball team whatever you like. But the people in New York and
Boston, at least, will not be fooled.
Of course, we no longer live in the Founders’ world. In
today’s political context, people often oppose republics to direct
democracies, and they associate republicanism with protection
against majoritarian excess. So the title of the book will likely
communicate Barnett’s message more directly to a modern
audience that knows little about the ideology of the Founders.
Barnett could have called his book “Our Lockean Constitution,”
or “Our Natural Rights Constitution,” or “Our Classical Liberal
Constitution,” but these titles might not have sold as well to a
general audience, or—in the case of the last one—were already
taken.71 In fact, the title “Our Republican Constitution” was
already taken. A book with that name was written in 2005 by
Adam Tomkins, a British public law scholar.72 Tomkins argues
that despite the persistence of the monarchy, the U.K. has
essentially become a republic and should be governed according

70. RICHARDSON, supra note 67, at 21, 34–36. See, e.g., Homestead Act of 1862, ch.
75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (granting settlers 160 acres of government land); Land-Grant
Agricultural and Mechanical College Act of 1862 (Morrill Act), 12 Stat. 503 (1862)
(establishing system for land-grant colleges and universities to teach agriculture and
engineering); see also Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule, supra note 7, at 40 (1990) (noting
how the distributive goals of early Republicans aimed at securing the economic
independence necessary for republican government).
71. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE
UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014).
72. ADAM TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION (2005).
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to republican principles. His account of republicanism largely
tracks the historical account I have described in this Essay.
V. REPUBLICANISM IN THE PRESENT
What is at stake in recalling the historical republican
tradition? First, the historical tradition of republicanism contrasts
markedly with Barnett’s version of Our Republican Constitution.
It is also not identical with Barnett’s “Democratic Constitution.”
Therefore the choice he offers between the “Republican” and
“Democratic” constitutions is a false choice.
Second, the historical republican tradition—or parts of it, at
any rate—is a more attractive account of America’s constitutional
values than Barnett’s version of “Our Democratic Constitution,”
which largely serves as a rhetorical foil for his preferred version
of the Constitution.73
Third, the Founders were neither simply republican nor
liberal. They were creative thinkers who employed many different
strains of thought to solve the problems of their day. Therefore, if
our goal is to offer a sympathetic account of the American
constitutional tradition that we might use today, we should take
the best elements of both traditions. We cannot simply leave
republicanism on the cutting room floor.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the historical
republican tradition may be far more relevant to understanding
our current predicament than Barnett’s classical liberal account,
because it speaks directly to fears of growing oligarchy,
aristocracy, and corruption, and because it values a public good
that is separate from the ambitions and strivings of individuals and
groups. Viewed sympathetically, the historical republican
tradition helps explain many of the contemporary concerns of
liberals and conservatives, populists and progressives; we can find
its themes in both the contemporary Democratic and Republican
parties.

73. I say “parts of it” because the historical tradition has both conservative and
radical/egalitarian versions and elements, as described supra text at notes 5–8. Moreover,
as noted above, liberal and republican elements can balance and critique each other. The
best parts of the liberal tradition, for example, can help us critique inegalitarian features
of the republican tradition: its complacency about slavery, property qualifications for
voting, and the domination of women within families.
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Start with conservatives and Republicans. Many of them are
deeply concerned about the promoting the public good (especially
social and religious conservatives). They are also concerned about
corruption in government, which they identify with liberal and
secular elites. At the same time, many conservative Republicans
also believe that establishment Republicans and Republican elites
have repeatedly treated them like dupes and sold them out to
benefit the economic interests of the wealthy.
Meanwhile, many liberals and Democrats believe that
government has been hijacked by an economic oligarchy that has
used government to exacerbate inequalities of wealth, to enrich
itself at the expense of ordinary Americans, and to block sensible
reforms in the public interest.
Both people on the left and on the right, in short, have come
to the conclusion that government is for sale, that the political
system is rigged against them, and that politicians are being
bought and sold by powerful economic interests who have formed
a new oligarchy and aristocracy. The wealthiest and most
powerful people and businesses have entrenched their allies in
power so that ordinary people can’t catch a break. This economic
and cultural aristocracy has turned government into a device for
protecting its own wealth and political power, and shifted the
economic risks of globalization and change onto the middle class
and the poor. There are both left-wing and right-wing versions of
these concerns, with somewhat different villains and culprits. Yet
the left- and right-wing versions of this complaint have many
similarities.
These concerns about aristocracy, oligarchy, selfentrenchment, and corruption have led to angry populist
mobilizations, with groups on both the left and the right
demanding their country back. The historical republican tradition
is of two minds about these developments. On the one hand, these
protests speak to core republican concerns. On the other, they
create the real risk that our politics will fracture into powerful
factions that are uninterested in promoting the public good, or
that will degenerate into authoritarianism, despotism, and
tyranny.
The historical republican tradition teaches us that we must
organize our politics to preserve a broad middle class of citizens
who have a stake in governance, and that we must work
continuously to prevent corruption, oligarchy, and political self-
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entrenchment from undermining our politics. Because change in
political and economic circumstances is constant, we must be
eternally vigilant in asking where the sources of oligarchy and
aristocracy now exist in our system, and rethink the problems and
obligations of republican government anew.
Barnett himself might agree with many of these sentiments,
although he and I might disagree about the particular sources of
the problem and about the most appropriate solutions. But his
version of Our Republican Constitution—which is essentially an
idealization of nineteenth-century classical liberalism—seems to
me altogether too thin to recognize and meet these contemporary
concerns. By insisting that the central, if not sole, purpose of
government is to protect natural rights—including, most
prominently, the right to acquire and accumulate property—his
account seems to talk past what concerns many people today
about our political and constitutional system, not only on the left,
but also on the right. In fact, Barnett’s account of the purposes of
government actually disables us from talking about the problems
of political economy that the historical theory of republicanism
was centrally concerned with.
Barnett’s book was designed both to promote and intervene
in a particular kind of political conversation about the country and
the Constitution. Barnett states candidly that “Our Republican
Constitution will not be restored in our two-party system until one
of the two major political parties embraces it as a central plank of
its political platform” (p. 252). And he is equally clear about
which party that would be: “The natural home of the Republican
Constitution is the modern Republican Party” (p. 252).
Accordingly, Barnett hoped that the Republican Party would
shed its cronyism and become a party devoted to the restoration
of Our Republican Constitution. Thoughtful politicians like
Senators Rand Paul and Mike Lee might forge a new Republican
coalition devoted to a rigorous constitutional conservatism (pp.
252-253). This would present a clear choice between a Republican
party devoted to libertarianism and limited government and a
Democratic Party committed to progressive social democracy and
environmentalism (p. 253). While this book was being written,
there was a genuine possibility—at least among conservative
intellectuals—that this development might occur and that it would
frame the 2016 election.
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Yet by the middle of 2016, Americans seem to be having a
very different political conversation about the country and the
Constitution. The political base of the Republican Party—as
opposed to its political elites, wealthy donors, and intellectuals—
seems remarkably uninterested in Barnett’s vision. The party’s
2016 presidential nominee, Donald Trump, cares little for civil
liberties and even less for limited government. Indeed, to the
extent that Trump has any consistent positions at all, he seems to
stand for the opposite of everything that Barnett holds dear.
Trump is a nightmare version of Barnett’s Democratic
Constitution, not because he is a good government progressive,
but because he is at heart a Schmittian. In Carl Schmitt’s vision of
popular sovereignty, the dictator rules through a collective shout
or affirmation by the mass of the people.74 In the same way,
Trump insists that he speaks for the people collectively—he calls
them a great “silent majority”75—and he asserts that he is
authorized to act because the great mass of the people are behind
him. The irony is that at the very moment Barnett’s book is
published, the Republican Party risks becoming the natural home
not of Our Republican Constitution but Our Schmittian
Constitution.
Just as important as the rise of Trumpism, however, is a
remarkable shift in political conversation on both the left and the
right. Both sides of the political spectrum seem to be raising
historical republican themes—concerning corruption, oligarchy,
and abandonment of the public good. This conversation is
sometimes ill-formed, ugly, and even idiotic, but it raises many of
the central questions that historical republicanism was concerned
with. How can we restore public virtue and devotion to the public
good? How can we restore trust in public and private institutions
that have proven themselves corrupt and have been undermined
by the naked pursuit of self-interest and self-dealing? How can we
prevent our government from being taken over by new forms of
oligarchy and aristocracy? How can we keep the republic—the res
publica, the public thing that belongs to us all—viable in a world

74. CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 131 (1928) (Jeffrey Seitzer trans.,
2008).
75. Sam Sanders, Trump Champions the ‘Silent Majority,’ But What Does That Mean
in 2016?, NPR (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/01/22/463884201/trumpchampions-the-silent-majority-but-what-does-that-mean-in-2016.
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of globalization, threats to our national security abroad, and selfseeking hucksterism at home?
In this swirling conversation of hope, despair, anger, and
frustration, Barnett’s attempt to restate the natural rights
tradition seems curiously beside the point. The only party that
might put his ideas into practice has imploded and broken into a
war between angry populists and establishment Republicans
desperate to maintain their political influence. For the moment,
at least, the proud Republican Party has been taken over by an
anti-republican demagogue. For classical liberals like Barnett, the
only hope is that Trump—in order to keep peace within his
party—will appoint judges whose views are closer to those of
constitutional conservatives than to his own. One suspects that
this was not the world Barnett imagined when he sat down to
write his book.
Events are moving quickly, however. Just as we cannot make
sense of our political traditions by neglecting or suppressing
historical republicanism, so too we cannot make sense of them by
neglecting or suppressing the historical traditions of liberalism,
including Barnett’s classical liberal brand. Whether or not the
Republican Party abandons its libertarian promise for a
revanchist populism, this book will remain a statement of a
powerful dissenting tradition within American conservatism. One
writes books not simply for the moment, but for an indefinite
future. Even though they may be mislabeled as “republican,”
history is far from finished with the ideas in this book.

